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AIM/AIL/Al CONTACTS
It is reasonable to conclude, however, that the Seider procedure can
no longer stand upon the quasi-in-rem rationale of Harris, so clearly re-
pudiated by the Court in Shaffiff. Moreover, as long as the procedure func-
tions as a judicially created direct action statute in which the nonresident.
tortfeasor still remains the real party at interest, it is of doubtful consti-
tutional validity under the fairness standard adopted in Shaffer.
CONCLUSION
By rejecting the territorial theory underlying in rem jurisdiction and
extending the principles of International Shoe to cover all assertions of state
court jurisdiction, the Court in Shaffer provided a more sensible standard
for the resolution of jurisdictional questions in a modern society in which
disputes arise from complex interstate transactions involving both persons
and property. However, in concluding - upon the Facts before it that the Del-
aware courts could not validly assert jurisdiction over nonresident corpo-
rate fiduciaries in a stockholder's derivative suit involving a Delaware cor-
poration, the Court applied the minimum contacts test too restrictively.
The Court's focus upon the absence•of the defendants' literal "acts" within
the forum •ignored the defendants' implicit contacts with the forum as
corporate officers and directors of a domestic corporation. Moreover, from
a practical viewpoint, the fact that the controversy centered upon the mis-
management of a Delaware corporation virtually eliminated the choice of
law question under the general rule of conflicts governing corporate officer
liability. The Court's relegation of the state's regulatory interest to a choice
of law consideration unnecessarily separated the jurisdictional and choice of
law issues when no danger of unfairness to the defendants actually existed.
The eventual impact of the Court's decision upon other jurisdictional
issues previously decided upon the in rem rationales of Pennoyer and Harris
remains to be determined upon a case by case basis. With respect to the
Seider jurisdictional procedure devised upon the now repudiated quasi-in-
rem rationale of Harris, it would appear unlikely that the procedure can
survive under the standard of fairness as applied by the Shaffer Court. Shaf-
fer reveals that the Court, in its approach to questions of jurisdiction under
the fairness standard, has not yet adopted interest analysis as urged by
some commentators and as employed most recently by proponents of the
continued validity of the Seider jurisdictional procedure.
BRIAN W. BLAESSI4:R
THE ROLE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN PROVING
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE
WASHINGTON V. DAVIS
In its landmark decision in Washington v. Davis,' the Supreme Court
held that proof of both an invidious discriminatory purpose and a racially
disproportionate impact in necessary to establish that a law or other official
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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act violates the equal protection clause. 2 While clearly expressing this intent
requirement, the Washington Court failed to elucidate the proper eviden-
tiary standard to apply in considering the sufficiency of plaintiffs' proof of
discriminatory intent. 3
The plaintiffs in Washington introduced statistical evidence showing
that black applicants for employment with the District of Columbia police
force failed an employment qualification test at a rate four times that of
white applicants. 4 The Court held that this evidence of disproportionate
impact, standing alone, was insufficient to warrant the conclusion that the
test was an intentionally discriminatory devices This holding suggests that
the Court found objective evidence of discriminatory impact insufficient to
establish the requisite intent without some direct proof of subjective dis-
criminatory motive.'
Although the Court indicated a reluctance to base a finding of intent
on objective evidence of discriminatory effect, it did note that "an invidious
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the rele-
vant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily
on one race than another."' In this vein, the Washington majority observed
that in jury selection cases, fOr example, statistical evidence showing a total
or seriously disproportionate exclusion of blacks may be sufficient to estab-
lish discriminatory intent, "because in various circumstances the discrimina-
tion is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds." In making this ob-
servation respecting the import of statistical or other evidence of impact,
however, the Washington majority failed to specify either the degree of
statistical disparity necessary to allow a court to infer discriminatory intent,
or the situations in which the probative value of such evidence would be
lessened by the presence of alternative, nonracial explanations for the dis-
proportionate im pac0
Justice Stevens, concurring in Washington, noted that the burden of
proving discriminatory intent involves different evidentiary considerations
depending on the context in which the alleged discrimination arises." He
observed that "objective evidence of what actually happened rather than
evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor" will fre-
quently be the most probative evidence of intent.'' Justice Stevens con-
tended that this conclusion was particularly true when the alleged discrimi-
nation involves government action which is the product of compromise,
collective decision-making, and mixed motivations, since in these contexts it
is difficult or impossible to uncover evidence of the actual subjective intent
2 Id, at 239.
3 /d. at 242.
4 Among the applicants tested from 1968 through 1971, 57% of the blacks and 13% of
the whites failed the tests. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958.59 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
5
 426 U.S. at 246.
" The Court in Washington did not distinguish between the terms "intent," "purpose
and "motive." The Court has never made an express distinction between objective intent and
subjective motive, and has often used the_ terms interchangeably. See, e.g., United Slates v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
7
 426 U.S. at 242.
Id.
° Id.
10 Id, at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"Id.
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of the decisionmakers." While Justice Stevens' opinion suggests a more lib-
eral attitude toward the weight. and role of objective evidence of effect in
inferring discriminatory intent than does the majority's opinion," both
opinions leave unsettled the specific circumstances in which evidence of
discriminatory effect is sufficient to establish an equal protection violation
without direct evidence of discriminatory intent.' 4
This note will initially examine the different. types of evidence which
may be used to establish discriminatory intent. It will then propose a test
for determining which of these types of evidence is most probative of dis-
criminatory intent in the various factual contexts in which equal protection
claims arise. In developing this test, particular exphasis will be placed on
determining when the use of statistical evidence is proper. Finally, the test
will be applied to post-Washing-ton equal protection cases in three areas—
housing, school desegregation, and jury selection—to compare the manner
in which the proposed test comports with the evidentiary standards actually
employed by the courts.
I. TYPES OF EVIDENCE USED TO PROVE INTENT
Evidence which proves intent may be classified into two categories: di-
rect. and circumstantial." Direct evidence, as it. relates to equal protection
intent, includes evidence respecting facts tending to establish the subjective
motives of the officials involved in the alleged discrimination." Thus, pub-
lic statements," minutes of meetings," facially discriminatory actions or
legislation," and actual testimony 2" are examples of direct evidence of in-
tent. Circumstantial evidence in the equal protection context includes evi-
dence of facts which, although not establishing discriminatory motive,
nevertheless form a basis for inferring discriminatory intentY Accordingly,
" IfL
13 See text at note fi supra.
"See 426 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring).
''The Supreme Court has long recognized that intent may be established by direct evi-
dence of motive w purpose, or by circumstantial evidence of effect. See Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev, Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (intent to discriminate in
housing); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961) (intent to aid religion); Radio Of-
ficers' Union of the Commercial Telegraphers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954) (intent
to discriminate against union); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 31 (1945) (intent to corn-
mit treason). See, e.g., Brest, Palmer v. Thompson; An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sur. Cr. Rev. 95.
1 " Thus, the sources of evidence of intent listed by the Court in Arlington. Heights, 429
U.S. at 267.68, which included the historical: background, prior event, and contemporaneous
statements by officials, fall into the direct evidence category since they tend to establish the
motivation of the officials involved. See text at notes 58-64 infra.
' 7 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 250 (1971); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo,
425 E. Stipp. 987, 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1976), modified, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977).
1 " Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hons. I)ev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270
(1977).
It' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U,S. 1 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948) ; Reed v.
Rhodes, 422 F. Stipp. 708, 715 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
" Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 253-54 (1971).
Thus, the evidence of the discriminatory impact or effect of an official action may be
used to infer intent. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. See also Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398,
403-04 (1945) ("A purpose to discriminate must be present which may be proven by systematic
exclusion of eligible jurymen of the proscribed race.")
797
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
examples of circumstantial evidence of intent include statistical evidence of
racially disproportionate" impact and facially neutral official actions having
foreseeably discriminatory results."
The terms "direct" and "circumstantial" are thus applied to these
types of intent evidence because of the important conceptual difference be-
tween what these two types of evidence show. On one hand, direct evidence
proves the actual, subjective intent of the defendants charged with dis-
crimination." On the other hand, circumstantial evidence redefines intent
in terms of objectively observable data, but proves nothing about the actual
subjective intent on the defendants." The majority opinion in Washing-
ton, by holding that plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence of discriminatory im-
pact was insufficient to allow the trier of fact. to infer intent on the part of
the defendants, 2° seemed to suggest that some direct evidence of intent is
necessary in most equal protection cases." Nevertheless, as noted earlier,
this interpretation of Washington is substantially eroded by the Court's ob-
servation that in jury selection cases, circumstantial evidence may often be
sufficient to allow an inference of discriminatory intent."
Although the Court in Washington suggested that direct intent evi-
dence was to be preferred,'" and held that such evidence was required in
the case before it," it did not provide guidelines for determining when this
presumption favoring direct evidence of intent should be overridden so
that circumstantial evidence alone would be sufficient to prove intent. It is
submitted that courts should be guided by two factors in determining
whether circumstantial evidence should be held sufficient to prove intent.
These factors are the relative availability and reliability of the two types of
evidence. 3 ' In applying these factors, courts should permit plaintiffs to es-
tablish intent through reliable circumstantial evidence of discriminatory ef-
fect when direct evidence of intent is either unavailable or unreliable. 3 '
22 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
23
 Numerous courts, particularly in the school desegregation context, have used the
foreseeable consequences lest to infer intent from evidence of facially neutral actions with dis-
criminatory impact. The test is applied to evidence of official actions, and holds that if the ac-
tions had a natural, probable, foreseeable and actual segregative effect; the actor intended that
effect. See Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974); Penick v.
Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Stipp, 229, 252 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Arthur v. Nyquist, 429 F.
Stipp. 206, 211 ( W.D.N.Y. 1977). A similar test of intent is used in tort and criminal law. See
W. PROSSER, THE LAW or TORTS § 8 (4th Ed. 1971); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961);
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 31 (1945).
"See Brest, supra note 15, at n.104.
"Id.
26 The Washington Court suggested that the plaintiffs' evidence may have raised an in-
ference of intent, but that defendants "negated any inference" of intent. 426 U.S. at 246.
"Id. at 245.
21 Id at 239, 241.
29 "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an in-
vidious racial discrimination."Id. at 242.
"Id. at 246.
31
 Brest, supra note 15, discusses the "ascertainability," "futility" and "disutility" of evi-
dence of motive, which this note refers to as direct evidence of intent. The factor of
availability roughly parallels that of ascertainability, and reliability corresponds to futility and
disutility, but the concepts are not meant to be identical.
32 Weighing these competing factors results in a "sliding scale" approach to evidentiary
problems in equal protection cases. Other commentators have similarly advocated a sliding
scale approach for balancing evidence of motive and effect. See Note, 25 EMORY L. J. 737,756
(1976).
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These factors may be applied to the specific problem of establishing
discriminatory intent in the equal protection context. For example, direct
evidence of intent will be unavailable when, because of the routine nature
of the official practices under consideration, officials need not give any mo-
tives or explanations for their actions." 3 If the actions themselves are fa-
cially neutral and follow accepted procedures, and if they implement non-
discriminatory policies or purposes, the plaintiffs may be unable to adduce
any direct evidence of motive. 34 Similarly, direct evidence will be unreliable
when the alleged equal protection violations occur over an extended period
of time or involve a relatively large number of officials. The motivation of'
any one official in these situations is apt to be less reliable for determining
the intent of the official body as a whole in committing the alleged viola-
tions than in situations where the violation involves action by a few officials
over a short period of time."'
If direct evidence is either unavailable or unreliable, the plaintiff
should be able to rely more heavily on available circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory impact or effect than when such direct evidence is readily
available. Such circumstantial evidence could include statistics of racial
under-representation," or of the disproportionate impact of the challenged
action," or evidence of a pattern of facially neutral acts which had foresee-
able discriminatory results." The reliability of this circumstantial evidence
for proving intent depends on two factors:( I) the possibility of alternative,
nonracial explanations for the disproportionate impact, and (2) the actual
degree of discriminatory impact. When there are no alternative expla-
nations for the impact and the degree of impact is high, the reliability of
the circumstantial evidence should presumably be established and it should
carry great probative weight."" Conversely, when alternative nonracial ex-
For example, in the jury selection context, district attorneys striking prospective
jurors under a peremptory challenge system would not be required to give motives for their
actions. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), Similarly, school administrators en-
gaged in the routine assignment of pupils to schools under a neighborhood assignment policy
may not be required to give their motives for any particular assignment. See Reed v. Rhodes,
422 F. Stipp. 708, 712-17 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
34 Questioning of officials as to their discriminatory motives often may be futile, see
Brest, supra note 15, at 125, and such motives may be protected by legislative immunity. See
note 46 infra.
See Keyes v. School Dist. #1, 413 U.S. 189, 233 (1973); Hart v. Community School
Bd., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975) ("the injustice of ascribing collective will to articulate re-
marks of particular bigots"); Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empiri-
cal Analysts, 60 CALW. I.. Rrv. 275, 284-85 (1972).
3" See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. '202, 205-09 (1965).
"See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
" See Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 181-82 (6th Cir. 1974).
" These factors seemingly underlay the Washington Court's recognition of a greater
probative value for statistical effect evidence in jury discrimination cases than in other con-
texts. See text at note 8 supra. See also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 n.15. If differences in
qualifications for jury service are taken into account, statistics showing a high degree of minor-
ity under-representation on a number of juries are apt to be very reliable indicators of dis-
criminatory intent, since the possibility of alternative explanations is reduced.
In Washington, the statistical evidence indicated a 4 to I failure rate for blacks over
whites. 426 U.S. at 237. While this was evidence of a high degree of discriminatory impact, the
evidence was not given great probative weight since the possibility of alternative explanations
existed in the employment context. The Court suggested that levels of competence and verbal
skills, rather than intentional racial discrimination, explained the disproportion. Id. at 245-46.
The court of appeals considering the case also noted that the disproportionate failure rate "is
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planations are available, and the degree of disproportionate racial impact is
low, the reliability of the circumstantial evidence for proving intent will be
less, and some direct evidence of discriminatory motive may be required.
The use and weight given to circumstantial evidence under the pro-
posed test should be determined by balancing the availability and reliability
of the circumstantial evidence against that of direct evidence in the particu-
lar discrimination context involved. Since often both types of evidence are
available and reliable," and since a great deal of evidence is neither wholly
direct not wholly circumstantial in nature,'" no exact lines can be drawn for
determining when circumstantial evidence alone will be sufficient to prove
intent. In general, however, as the availability and reliability of direct evi-
dence is reduced, the probative value of reliable circumstantial evidence
must be increased. One corollary to this conclusion is that when direct evi-
dence of discriminatory motive is totally unavailable or unreliable, cir-
cumstantial evidence alone should be sufficient to establish discriminatory
intent.
11. APPLICATION OF THE AVAILABILITY/RELIABILITN' TEST TO SELECTED
EQUAL PROTECTION AREAS
Having identified the factors of availability and reliability as key de-
terminants of the relative probative weights to be assigned to direct and
circumstantial evidence of intent, it is useful to apply these factors to dif-
ferent equal protection contexts. This section will discuss the application of
the general principle to the areas of housing, school desegregation, and
jury selection, and will examine how courts since Washington have treated
evidence of discriminatory intent in these contexts.
A. Housing Discrimination
The evidentiary standard for proving discriminatory intent in housing
cases is influenced by the fact that often a single act or decision of the local
zoning board, rather than a pattern of activities or longstanding practice, is
the basis of the alleged equal protection violation. 42 Consequently, a court
may narrowly focus its inquiry upon the action of a relatively small number
of individuals over a short period of time. 43
 The motives of these few indi-
the result of the long history of educational deprivation, primarily due to segregated schools,
for blacks." Davis v. Washington, 512 F. 2d, 956, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Thus, the presence of
an alternative explanation based on differences in educational levels for white and black appli-
cants reduced the reliability of the statistical evidence for inferring discriminatory intent.
4° Courts have noted the availability of both circumstantial and direct evidence in Cas-
taneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-99 (1977) and in ResidEnt Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 56-4 F.
2d. 126, 144 (3d Cir. 1977),
4 ' Justice Steven in Washington noted that "the line between discriminatory purpose and
discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of
the Court's opinion might assume." 426 U.S. at '254 (Stevens, J., concurring). In the case of
some official actions with discriminatory impact. the actions themselves may be directly indica-
live of intent, and intent may also be inferred from the consequences or effects of the actions.
See Reed, 422 F. Stipp. at 715.
" The housing decisions since Washington have involved single acts of zoning boards or
city agencies. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hulls. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977): Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1977).
43 In Arlington Heights, the zoning board consisted of only seven persons. 429 U.S. at
258.
800
IiiiISH/NGTON V. DA !'IS DEVELOPA1ENTS
viduals will therefore be highly probative of the intent of the board as a
whole; the reliability of direct evidence Of motivation for proving the intent
behind the official act accordingly should be high.
The availability of direct evidence in housing cases is also apt to be
high because zoning decisions and enforcement of housing ordinances
often require the board members to make decisions based on individual,
particular situations and fact patterns rather than on the routine applica-
tion of general rules." Public statements and minutes of meetings may be
available, although zoning decisions are frequently made behind closed
doors. 45 Fluidly, to the extent that housing and zoning boards are charac-
terized as administrative rather than as legislative bodies, the motives of
their members would not be subject to the presumption of constitutionality
that courts often impute to legislative motives, and the officials could be
closely questioned at t•ia1. 4" Thus, both the reliability and availability of di-
rect evidence of intent in housing discrimination cases generally should be
high,
The high availability and reliability of direct. evidence of intent in
housing cases is particularly significant since circumstantial evidence may
not always be _immediately available. Plaintiffs may have to wait for some
time after the allegedly discriminatory decision for its impact to be re-
flected in statistics showing disproportionate racial effect, such as changes
in the racial composition of the area. 47 However, if' the decision involved
the refusal to build housing specifically designated for minorities, the dis-
criminatory impact would be felt at once, and circumstantial evidence
would be immediately available. 48
In addition to the problem of varying availability, the reliability of cir-
cumstantial evidence in housing cases is often suspect. The presence of al-
ternative explanations for zoning decisions based, for example, on a desire
to protect property values" tends to weaken the reliability of statistical evi-
dence seemingly showing that a particular decision disproportionately af-
fected racial minorities.
See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Nectuw v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
"See Cohen, Equal Protection Clause and The Fair Housing Act: Judicial Alternatives for
Exclusionary Zoning Challenges after Arlington Heights, 6 ENV, AF:. 63, 81 (1977), where the au-
thor discusses the manner in which zoning decisions are made, noting that frequently there is
"HO published, or readily obtainable, report or the meeting." Id.
"Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268. The Arlington Heights Court noted that judicial
review of legislative motives at trial might be barred by the separation of powers doctrine or
by legislative immunity from testifying. Id. See also 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENct: §2371
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). These problems would not be present in the judicial review of
administrative motives. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 80.
47 See, e.g., Reitthan v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 390 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" The cancellation by city officials of a planned public housing project to be occupied
largely by blacks furnished immediate evidence of discriminatory impact in Resident Advisory
Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F. 2d 126, 143-44 (3d Cir.1977).
" A zoning decision based on property values might be challenged on wealth discrimi-
nation rather than on racial discrimination grounds. The Supreme Court has held that legis-
lative classifications based on wealth are not inherently suspect, and thus not subject to strict
scrutiny under traditional equal protection analysis unless a fundamental interest is involved.
San Antonio Independent School Dist.. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 24, 29 (1973): United States
v. Kra5, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-70
(1966). The right to housing is not a fundamental interest for equal protection purposes.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
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On balance, while both direct and circumstantial evidence of intent
may be available in housing discrimination cases, the reliability of direct
evidence of motives will often be greater than that of circumstantial evi-
dence of impact for proving discriminatory intent. Since only a relatively
small number of officials may be involved in the decision, and since the de-
cision itself may be a single official action, the reliability of direct evidence
of discriminatory motives for proving discriminatory intent on the part of
the board as a whole should be high. In these circumstances, the proposed
test set forth above would mandate that in housing discrimination cases the
presumption in favor of direct evidence of motive should prevail, and cir-
cumstantial evidence of discriminatory impact alone should not be suffi-
cient to prove discriminatory intent.
This result is in fact that reached by the Supreme Court in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp." There, the
plaintiff, a nonprofit housing developer, applied for a rezoning of a single
family tract to permit the construction of low- and moderate-income multi-
ple family housing. The Village denied the rezoning request, citing a con-
cern for property values and the integrity of the Village's zoning plan. The
plaintiff brought suit, alleging that the Village's decision violated the equal
protection clause. The court of appeals agreed, and held that the denial of
the petition for rezoning violated the fourteenth amendment since its "ul-
timate effect" was discriminatory. 5 '
The Supreme Court reversed, determining that plaintiff had failed to
prove that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the official
zoning decision.52
 Proof of this purpose required an "inquiry into such cir-
cumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." 53 Cir-
cumstantial evidence of discriminatory impact, the Court concluded, is not
determinative of discriminatory intent unless the degree of discriminatory
impact is so extreme that it is "unexplainable on grounds other than
race.""
5 " 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
'' Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2(1 409, 414
(7th Cir. 1975). The court of appeals reversed the district court, which had held that the vil-
lage had been motivated by a legitimate desire to protect property values and to preserve the
integrity of the zoning plan, and had found no discriminatory effect. 373 F. Supp. 208, 211
(N.D. Ill. 1974).
52 429 U.S. at 270. It is interesting to compare this emphasis on the motivations of offi-
cials with the Court's earlier statement in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971), that
"no case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because
of the motivations of the men who voted for it." Id.
"429 U.S. at 266.
"Id. The Court in Arlington Heights, as it had in Washington, failed to enunciate a stan-
dard for determining what specific level of discriminatory impact would be inexplicable on
nonracial grounds. The Court did cite as examples of inexplicable impact Gomillion v. Light-
foot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 429 U.S. at 266.
In Gomillion, the official act of redrawing city boundaries changed the shape of Tus-
keegee, Alabama from a square to a twenty-eight sided figure and removed all but four of the
city's four hundred black voters from the city limits, while not removing a single white voter.
364 U.S. at 341. In Vick Wo, a local board had granted laundry permits to all but one of about
eighty white applicants, and had refused to grant permits to any of the two hundred Chinese
applicants. 118 U.S. at 359.
The Court's reference to Gomillion and Yick Wo suggests that the discriminatory impact
must be virtually total, affecting almost only minorities, in order for circumstantial evidence of
impact to be sufficient to prove intent. Yet, the Arlington Heights Court noted that "[b]ecause
of the nature of the jury-selection task, however, we have permitted a Finding of constitutional
802
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The Court's reasoning in Arlington Heights thus mirrors that underly-
ing the proposed availability/reliability test in two significant ways. First., the
Arlington Heights Court stated that both direct and circumstantial evidence,
if available, should be examined." The proposed test also considers the
availability of the two types of evidence in order to determine their relative
probative value. Second, the Court indicated that in order for circumstan-
tial evidence to be deemed determinative of the intent issue the degree of
discriminatory impact must be sufficient. to make alternative explanations
for the disproportion extremely improbable." The proposed test similarly
holds that effect evidence must be very reliable in order to be determina-
tive of intent. The Court also noted that in many cases, including presuma-
bly housing discrimination, evidence of disproportionate impact has limited
probative value clue to the heterogeneity of the nation's population." That
is, such evidence is unreliable because the diversity of the population makes
it probable that any official action will influence some minority groups dis-
proportionately; thus the probative value of the effect evidence is reduced,
and direct evidence is required to prove intent.
As noted earlier, 58
 the required use of direct evidence should increase
as the availability of such evidence increases. In this regard, it is noteworthy
that the Arlington Heights Court identified a number of evidentiary sources
which are available in many kinds of equal protection cases for establishing
direct proof of racial motivation." These include (1) the historical back-
ground of the decision, particularly if that background reveals a series of
purposeful discriminatory actions;"° (2) the specific sequence of events lead-
ing up to the challenged decision; 0 ' (3) departures from normal procedural
sequences or substantive criteritt;" 2
 and (4) the legislative or administrative
history of the decision, especially contemporaneous statements by officials,
minutes of meetings, reports, or testimony as to motivation." 3
 Significantly,
each type of evidence noted by the Court involves an analysis of a single
decision made by a few individuals; thus, the inquiry into motivation would
be narrowly focused, and the reliability of the evidence would be high,"
A similar conclusion respecting the reliability of direct evidence in
housing discrimination cases was reached subsequent to Arlington Heights by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Resident Advis-
my Board v. Rizzo."' In Rizzo, plaintiffs challenged a decision by the city of
Philadelphia cancelling construction of a proposed public housing project
violation even when the statistical pattern does not approach the extremes of Yick Wu or
Comillion,"429 U.S. at 266 n.13. This latter statement indicates that no single standard can be
set for determining when statistical impact evidence is sufficient to prove intent, but that the
nature of the discrimination context, and the factors of availability and reliability of the impact
evidence, must he considered separately in each case.
55
 429 U.S. :u 266.
50 id.
"Id. at n.15.
38 See text at notes 40-41 supra.
" hl at 267-68. The Court does not define these as "direct" evidence sources, but the
evidence in each case goes to the motives behind the decision rather than to its effects. Id.
"Id. at 267.
"I Id.
"Id,
"3
 Id. at 268,
"See text at notes 42-43 supra.
"5
 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977).
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in a white neighborhood of the city. The project would have been occupied
largely by blacks, and accordingly the cancellation had an immediate and
obvious disproportionate impact. The court of appeals found that the cir-
cumstantial evidence of impact coupled with direct evidence of motive were
sufficient to prove a discriminatory purpose. 66 Direct evidence satisfying
each of the four sources listed in Arlington Heights was available, and the re-
liability of the evidence was supported by the fact that a single decision—
the city's termination of the proposed housing project—was the basis of the
plaintiffs' claim. 07
 Thus, the high availability and reliability of direct evi-
dence required the use of that evidence to prove discriminatory motives.
In sum, courts in housing discrimination cases since Washington have
recognized the availability and reliability of direct evidence of motive for
proving discriminatory intent, and have not treated circumstantial evidence
of effect as sufficient to establish this intent. The Supreme Court's empha-
sis in Arlington Heights on discriminatory motive, and its suggested sources
of evidence, indicate that in the housing context direct evidence of motive
is necessary to prove an equal protection violation.
B. School Desegregation
In school desegregation cases, plaintiffs must prove that defendants
acted with a purpose or intent to segregate a meaningful or significant por-
tion of the school system. 68 if segregation in the pertinent school system
was not previously mandated by law, determining whether purposeful
segregation has occurred requires an analysis of official school board ac-
tion, often extending over a period of time." This analysis, in turn, may
require reference to a large quantity of evidence, since many officials and
agencies at both the state and local levels may have been involved in the ac-
tions alleged to have violated the equal protection clause."
The above factors tend to reduce the probative value of direct evi-
dence of discriminatory motive under the proposed availability/reliability
test. This conclusion is supported by two considerations. First, the
availability of direct evidence of intent in school desegregation cases is low.
The routine nature of many school board actions, such as district line
changes and attendance zone determinations, makes it unlikely that school
officials will have provided a statement of the reasons or motivations be-
hind these actions. 7 ' Furthermore, the actions are often facially neutral,
and may be justified by such nonracial policies as the desire for neighbor-
"3 Id. at 144-45.
" Id. at 143-44.
68 Keyes v. School Dist. #1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
'3" In Armstrong v. Brennan, 539 F. 2d 625 (7th Cir. 1976). the period was twenty
years. Id. at 634. In Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Ohio 1977), the
period of the alleged violations was twenty-three years. 429 F. Supp. at 236-37.
16 In Reed, defendants were the Governor of Ohio, the state Attorney General, the State
Board of Education, the Superintendent of Instruction, the Cleveland Board of Education, its
individual members, and the Superintendent of the Cleveland schools. 422 F. Supp at 712.
7 ' In Reed, the district court had to engage in guesswork and accept post hoc expla-
nations for changes in attendance zones and other school board actions over a twenty year
period, since contemporaneous statements or explanations of motives had not been made. Id.
at 715-17.
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hood schools or the minimization of costs." Departures from normal pro-
cedures and racially motivated statements by officials may he present, but
in general the availability of direct evidence will be slight." Second, in
proving an intent to segregate a meaningful portion of the entire school
system, the reliability of direct evidence that any one action or official was
motivated by racial discrimination is minimal,'" due to the large number of
officials involved and the extended time period of the violations. Thus, in
the school desegregation context, direct evidence of motive will be less
available and reliable than in the housing discrimination context."
In contrast, two types of circumstantial evidence of intent are readily
available in school desegregation cases. First, statistical evidence of racially
disproportionate enrollments is frequently available to plaintiffs." Second,
circumstantial evidence of official school board actions with foreseeable
segregative results often is available to infer intent." The extended time
period and the large number and variety of school board actions indicate
that many such "foreseeably segregative actions" should be present in a typ-
ical school desegregation case. Consequently, the availability of circumstan-
tial evidence in most cases will be high.
The reliability of circumstantial evidence of intent in desegregation
cases hinges on the degree of racial imbalance and the number of actions
which are shown to have foreseeable segregative impact. Where the racial
disproportion in student attendance patterns is high, and a large number
of' foreseeably segregative acts are shown to have been committed by the
defendant school officials and their predecessors over a period of time, the
reliability of this circumstantial evidence increases since the possibility of al-
ternative explanations for the disproportion based on residential segrega-
tion" or migration" is reduced.
On balance, the extended duration of' the segregation violation, the
routine character of school board actions, and the multiplicity of actors in-
volved in school desegregation suits sharply reduces the availability and re-
liability of direct evidence of motive. Circumstantial evidence, because of its
greater availability and potential reliability for proving intent, thus should
carry more probative weight in desegregation cases than should direct evi-
dence. If the degree of imbalance and extent of foreseeable segregative ac-
tions are great enough to preclude alternative explanations for the dis-
criminatory effect, circumstantial evidence alone should be sufficient to
prove discriminatory intent.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the Supreme Court has been
reluctant to assign a greater probative weight to circumstantial evidence
72 See Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Lduc., 429 F. Supp. 229, 257 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (bene-
fits of neighborhood school policy).
73 See Hart v. Community School Bd., 512 F. 2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975).
" See text at note 35 supra.
" Sec text at note 35 and mites 44-48 supra.
"'Such evidence was presented in Keyes v. School Dist. #1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Ar-
thur v. Nyquist, 429 F. Supp. 206 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
" Hart v. Community School Bd., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975); Oliver v. Michigan
State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974).
1" Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Ethic., 369 E. 2d 55, 58 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
847 (1967).
i" Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14 (1971).
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than to direct evidence in school desegregation cases. In Austin Independent
School District v. United States," the Court in a per curiam decision vacated a
lower court judgments' and remanded the case for reconsideration in light
of Washington." The Fifth Circuit, noting that "it is difficult—and often
futile—to obtain direct evidence"" of school officials' intentions, had based
its finding of intent on the natural, foreseeable, and inevitable segregative
results of the school district's compliance with a policy of assignment of
students to the schools closest to their homes." The Fifth Circuit thus had
inferred intent from circumstantial evidence."
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion to the Court's decision in Au-
stin,suggested that "the Court of Appeals may have erred by a readiness to
impute to school officials a segregative intent far more pervasive than the
evidence justified."" Justice Powell's opinion indicates that the Court may
have found the circumstantial evidence too unreliable to justify a finding of
system-wide segregative intent in the absence of any direct evidence of mo-
tive." The evidence of foreseeable segregative effect may have been suffi-
cient to justify a finding of intent in a smaller part of the system, but some
direct evidence of facially discriminatory actions might have been necessary
to establish system-wide intent.
The Supreme Court also considered the relative probative value of di-
rect and circumstantial evidence of intent in the school desegration context
in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman. 88 In Dayton,the district court had
held that a three-part "cumulative violation" had been established in the
Dayton school system," and ordered a system-wide desegregation remedy.
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment on the ground that the violation
did not "suffice to justify the remedy imposed."" While the Court's deci-
sion was based on the scope of the remedy, its opnion also discussed the
evidentiary problem. The Court noted that "[f]indings as to the motivations
of multimembered public bodies are of necessity difficult,"s' but also im-
plied that such findings were necessary given the limited nature of the cir-
cumstantial evidence presented in the "cumulative violation.""
Lower courts have been more willing than the Supreme Court to treat
available circumstantial evidence of foreseeable segregative actions and re-
"u 429 U.S. 990 (1977).
HE United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F. 2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976).
82
 429 U.S. at 990.
83 532•F. 2d at 388.
" Id. at 390.
83
 Id. at 388.
"" 429 U.S. at 991.
Justice Powell noted that specific circumstantial evidence of actions by school officials
contributing to segregation of Mexican-American students had been available and was used to
infer intent at an earlier stage in the case, but that this evidence was not used as a basis for
finding intent by the court of appeals. Id. at n. I. Under the availability/reliability theory, t his
additional evidence would have increased the reliability of the circumstantial evidence used by
the court of appeals and thus would have increased its probative value for inferring intent.
LE" 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
"Id. at 413. The cumulative violation included (1) the rescission of pro-integration res-
olutions by the school board. (2) the racial imbalance of the school system and (3) the use of
optiOnal attendance zones for two high schools. Id. at 411-13.
"Id. at 414.
" Id.
"Id. Under the theory proposed in this note, the more widespread and numerous seg-
regative actions are, the greater their reliability for proving intent since the possibility of non-
racial explanations is reduced.
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suiting racial imbalance as sufficient to infer discriminatory intent." Several
courts have expressly found that the Washington requirement of intent does
not prohibit the inference of that intent from actions with foreseeable seg-
regative consequences. 94 The unavailability of direct evidence has been
noted by these lower courts. For example, one court stated that "[a] stan-
dard requiring plaintiffs in a school desegregation , case to adduce direct
proof of a 'racial motive' on the part of a multi-person school board would
border on the impossible."' This perceived unavailability of direct evi-
dence underlies the lower courts' willingness to use the foreseeable con-
sequences test to infer intent circumstantially.
The foreseeable consequences test has been applied to a wide variety
of school board actions by lower courts to infer discriminatory intent. In
Reed v. Rhodes,"" plaintiffs claimed that the actions and policies of a number
of school officials had the "purpose and effect" of segregating the Cleve-
land public schools." Unlike the Supreme Court in Austin and Dayton, the
district court in Reed considered a large number of school board actions to
be available sources of circumstantial evidence of intent. These included
the failure to transfer black students to white schools," the use of optional
attendance zones," the use of "intact" busing of entire classes of black stu-
dents,'" the racially based assignment of faculty and staff, ] °' and the selec-
tion of school construction sites. 1 °2 13y finding so many available sources of
circumstantial evidence, the reliability of the evidence as a whole was in-
creased.
Reed v. Rhodes also demonstrates how the line between direct and cir-
cumstantial evidence, or between motive and effect, may become blurred in
the school desegregation context. The district court, apparently unwilling
to base its finding of discriminatory intent solely on circumstantial evidence
of actions with foreseeable segregative results, adopted an interesting
though somewhat disingenuous approach. The court maintained that when
the circumstantial evidence of discriminatory impact was so great that no
alternative explanation to discriminatory intent was possible—that is, when
the circumstantial evidence was extremely reliable—the evidence should be
reclassified as direct evidence. 1 U" Thus, the court concluded, "there is no
"See e.g., Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Ethic., 429 F. Stapp. 229 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Arthur
v. Nyquist, 429 F. Supp. 206 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
74 In Reed, the district court concluded that the use of the foreseeable consequences test
was "totally reconcilable" with the holding of Washington v. Davis, 422 F. Supp. at 715. In Ar-
thur, the court stated, "this court does not read either Washington v. Davis or Arlington to pro-
hibit the use of the foreseeable conseq6ences test to analyze circumstantial evidence in evaluat-
ing the intent of defendants in school cases." 429 F. Stipp. at 211.
"Penick, 429 F. Supp. at 255 (emphasis in original).
" 422 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
" Id. at 712.
"Id. at 732-33.
"Id. at 776-82.
150 Id. at 782-84.
l" Id. at 786-88.
'" Id. at 790-92. All of these sources were used in Reed as circumstantial evidence of in-
tent. Another court also considered the gerrymandering of attendance zone lines, the choice
of school bus routes, and the failure to hire or promote minority faculty and staff. Alvarado v.
El Paso Independent School District, 426 F. Supp. 575, 591-92 (W.D. Tex. 1976). Some of
these actions fall into a middle ground between direct and circumstantial evidence; their seg-
regative effect can be used to infer intent, but the actions themselves may be facially non-
neutral and indicative of discriminatory motives.
'" 3
 422 F. Supp. at 715.
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need to resort to the inferring of intent from effect." 104 The circuitous ap-
proach adopted by the Reed court would be unnecessary under the
availability/reliability theory, since the inference from very dramatic cir-
cumstantial evidence is itself considered sufficiently reliable for finding in-
tent, without direct evidence of motive.' 05
In summary, both the Supreme Court and lower courts have re-
sponded to the lack of available and reliable direct evidence of intent in
school desegregation cases by placing greater probative weight on cir-
cumstantial evidence of actions with foreseeable discriminatory effects. In
doing so, however, the courts have failed to develop a coherent standard
for determining when such evidence is sufficient to permit an inference of
intent. Moreover, the Supreme Court has seemingly required a greater
number of specific segregative actions,'" and thus a higher level of reliabil-
ity, for systemwide intent to be inferred from such circumstantial evidence
than have the lower courts.'"
C. jury Discrimination
The Washington Court observed that in cases alleging racial discrimi-
nation in -the selection of juries, circumstantial evidence showing the sys-
tematic exclusion of minorities could itself establish intent.' 08 Applying the
availability/reliability theory to the jury selection context leads to the same
result.
In the selection of jurors for petit juries in criminal and civil cases, the
district attorney has broad latitude to disqualify prospective jurors.'"
Under a peremptory challenge system, no reasons or motives for disqualifi-
cation need be given."° Direct evidence of discriminatory motives in the
selection of jurors for petit juries will therefore be unavailable unless pros-
ecutors voluntarily state their motives. In the earlier selection of jurors for
jury venires, however, the objective criteria used for qualification may be
examined to determine if, on their face, they are racially neutral."' In this
situation, some direct evidence would be available.
The reliability of direct evidence of motive in the actual jury selection
process depends in part on the number of officials involved and the length
of time over which the alleged discrimination took place. The subjective
motive of an individual prosecutor in disqualifying a single juror is less dis-
104 Id .
' 65 The court in Reed implied that a motive was shown: "Many of the incidents estab-
lished at trial... can be rationally attributed only to a deliberate and conscious desire to create
or perpetuate a segregated condition." Id.
'°6 Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. at 991 (Powell, J., con-
curring).
107 See text and note 92 supra.
100 426 U.S. at 241.
169
 The district attorney may disqualify a prospective juror for cause or without cause
through the exercise of peremptory challenges. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 211
(1965).
"Id. at 220. "The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exer-
cised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."
Id.
'" See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492-99 (1977) (selection procedures highly
subjective, subject to possible abuse); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209 (1965) (qualifica-
tions found to be neutral).
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positive on the issue of intent than if the alleged pattern of discrimination
occured over a period of many years and involved many prosecutors."'
Additionally, a motive to disqualify a black juror because the prosecutor
felt the juror would be unduly sympathetic to a black defendant is distin-
guishable from a prosecutorial motive to disqualify the same juror where
the motive stemmed from a desire to keep all blacks off juries. While the
former motive may be permissible," 3 the latter would not.'" Thus, evi-
dence that a prosecutor removed a juror "because he was black" is, stand-
ing alone, insufficient and unreliable to prove intent. In contrast, direct
evidence of racially biased qualifications for jury venires would be reliable,
if those qualifications were applied during the period of the alleged equal
protection violation,'" since by their nature they provided more objective
grounds for analysis than do the motives of individuals.
Circumstantial evidence of jury selection discrimination usually con-
sists of statistical evidence of minority under-representation or exclusion.'"
As the degree of exclusion increases, the reliability of the evidence in-
creases since the disproportion becomes statistically more meaningful and
thus the probative value of statistical evidence becomes greater. 17 In addi-
tion, the reliability of statistical evidence is increased if the statistics are
chosen so as to reflect the disproportion clue only to race, and not due to
other factors such as age or education.'"
On balance, the relative unavailability and lack of reliability of direct
evidence of intent in petit jury selection and the high reliability of cir-
cumstantial statistical evidence of disproportionate effect indicate that the
probative value of statistical evidence in petit jury discrimination cases
should be higher than in housing or school desegregation cases. Since the
probative value is very high, a lesser degree of discriminatory effect should
be required to establish discriminatory intent in petit jury cases than in
housing or desegregation cases. However, in cases of discrimination involv-
ing the selection of jury venires, direct evidence of intent may be available
by questioning individual jury commissioners about their motives in select-
ing jurors, or by examining the criteria for venire selection to determine if'
they are discriminatory on their lace or subject to possible abuse. In venire
cases, therefore, some direct evidence of intent. may be required, and a
"'See, Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495 (eleven years); Swain, 380 U.S. at 205 (eleven years);
Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1970) (six years).
"3 See Swain v, Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). But see United States v, Robinson,
421 F. Supp. 467, 473 (D. Conn. 1976) (cumulative effect of excessive numbers of legitimate
challenges may require corrective action).
14 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24 (precluding challenges to the results of a peremptory
challenge system in any one case, but indicating that if a peremptory challenge system were
used to exclude blacks from all petit juries in case after case, this would violate equal protec-
tion); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F. 2d 1064, 1076 (5th Cir. 1977) (no evidence of con-
tinued and systematic exclusion).
'"s See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-99 (1977).
I" Such statistical evidence was employed in Castaneda v, Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 486-87
(1975); Carter v. Jury Comm., 396 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545,
550-52 (1967); Akins v. -rexas, 325 U.S. 398, 405.06 (1945).
"T See generally Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimi-
nation Cases, 80 HARv, L. RE,v, 338, 340-53 (1966).
' 1 ' Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Castaneda considered differences in age and
literacy as possible alternative explanations for the racial disproportion. 430 U.S. at 504-07.
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greater discriminatory effect should be required to establish intent than in
the petit jury cases.
The jury discrimination cases decided since Washington support the
conclusion that circumstantial evidence of the disproportionate effect-of a
juror selection system should be highly probative of intent. In Castaneda v.
Partida,"° the Supreme Court considered both direct and circumstantial
evidence of intent in concluding that the Texas system of grand jury selec-
tion violated the equal protection clause."° The Court first looked to the
available statistical evidence, and found that although the relevant county
population was 79.1% Mexican-American in 1970, over an eleven year
period only 39% of those summoned for grand jury service were
Mexican-Americans."' The state failed to show that the eleven year period
was not reliable,' 22 and the Court considered at length the statistical im-
probability that the under-representation could have been caused by ran-
dom selection.' 23
The inference of intent raised by the circumstantial evidence in Cas-
taneda was supported by direct evidence that the selection process relied on
highly subjective criteriam to choose grand jurors, so that the procedures
were subject to abuse and were not facially neutra1. 125 Thus, although the
Court's finding of intent in Castaneda did not rely solely on circumstantial
evidence, the order and length of discussion of each type of evidence indi-
cates clearly that the Court considered the statistical evidence to be the
most probative of intent.' 26
Lower courts have also treated statistical evidence of discriminatory
impact in jury selection cases as being the most probative of intent.'"
However, the courts have noted that the statistical under-representation
must be substantiall" and must involve more than a single jury before an
inference of intent is permissible.'" In United Slates v. Robinson,' 30 the dis-
trict court held that the use of a peremptory challenge system which re-
duced the number of petit juries with at least one black member from an
expected figure of 50% to an actual figure of 18%' 3 ' was sufficient to
119 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
120 1d. at 500-01.
121 Id. at 495.
122 Id. at 496. The statistical evidence may have carried a presumption of reliability in
the majority's view, since the majority placed the burden of proof for showing its unreliability
on the state. Id,
123 Id. at n.17. Justice Burger's dissent also focused on the reliability of the statistical
evidence, but concluded that it was insufficient to make out a prima facie equal protection vio-
lation. Id. at 507.
'" The following qualifications were among those used: the juror must be a citizen of
Texas and of the county, a registered voter, of "sound mind and good moral character," liter-
ate, with no prior felony convictions, and under no indictment. Id. at 485.
122
 Id. at 497.
126
 The Court noted that the statistical evidence alone was sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. Id. at 495-96. Thus, although direct evidence of intent was also
available, the Court indicated that such direct evidence was not necessary to prove intent. Id.
at 496.
I" See, e.g., Newman v. Henderson, 539 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conti. 1976).
'" United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F. 2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1977).
129 United States v. Jackson, 433 F. Supp. 239, 242 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
129
 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976).
131 Id. at 472.
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prove discriminatory intent,'" 2 even ht-ough the court recognized that non-
racial factors might have caused some of the disproportion.'" The court in
Robinson made it clear that the intent required was inferred solely from
evidence of effect, and that direct evidence of racial motivation was irrele-
vant and unnecessary. 134
Similarly, in Newman v. Henderson, 135 the United States Court. of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit inferred discriminatory intent solely from cir-
cumstantial evidence of statistical under-representation of blacks on grand
juries.' 3" The court distinguished Washington by comparing the reliability of
circumstantial evidence in employment and in jury cases. In the jury con-
text, the statistics presented to the court took into account the possibility of
alternative explorations in defining the disparity so that "any disparity can-
not be attributed to the fact that one group is better qualified than another,
as in Washington."'" The statistics used showed the disparity between the
percentage of blacks qualified to sit on grand juries and the percentage
which did in fact sit on grand juries.'" Since the possibility of alternative
explanations based on differences in qualifications was eliminated, the
statistical evidence was reliable and sufficient to establish discriminatory in-
tent.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court and lower court since Washington
have treated statistical evidence as sufficient to establish intent in the cases
of discrimination in the selection of juries. In the jury venire cases, some
direct evidence of intent may be available and, if so, should be required.
CONCLUSION
Washington v. Davis left unresolved the proper evidentiary standards
to be used in proving discriminatory intent in different equal protection
areas. This note has identified two major types of evidence of intent, direct
and 'circumstantial, and has suggested that by examining their availability
and reliability courts may be able to determine the relative probative weight
to assign to each type.
In general, proof of discriminatory motives is far more difficult for
plaintiffs in equal protection cases than proof of discriminatory impact or
effect. To the extent that courts demand direct evidence of intent and de-
fine that intent subjectively, as in the housing cases, the burden of proof on
'plaintiffs increases and it becomes More difficult to challenge successfully a
statute or official action on equal prdtection grounds. Conversely, to the ex-
tent that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish objectively defined
intent, as in the jury cases, the burden of proof on plaintiffs is reduced.
1" M. at 473.
1 " The court mentioned that the disproportion could also be due to differences in vot-
ing registration or education levels. Id. at 472-73.
' 34 Id, at 473 n.7. The Robinson court recognized that Swain precluded attack on the use
of peremptory challenges on any one jury, but noted that Swain intimated that the excessive
use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the entire jury process would warrant
corrective action. Id. at 473-74.
133 539 F. 2d 502 (5th Cir. 1976).
08 /d. at 505.
"'Id.
'° Id.
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Thus, by altering the evidentiary standard for proof of intent, courts pre-
sumably could advance those rights felt to be essential, such as fair repre-
sentation on juries, and impede those rights felt to be superfluous or so-
cially disruptive, such as the right to integrate neighborhoods. By adopting
the availability/reliability test, the issues of policy would properly be re-
moved from the evidentiary problem of proving intent, and courts would
be provided with a single objective standard for weighing the sufficiency of
plaintiff? proof of intent in all equal protection contexts.
MICHAEL  A. COLLOTTA
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